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Abstract Strategic management in Asia is different. Decision-making differs from that
taught in Western, and even Asian, schools of business. In the last decade, the influence of
Japanese management systems on Western management practice has become evident.
Though the Japanese economy is the world's second largest, and Japan's population
substantial, neither compares with the combined economies and combined populations of
non-Japanese Asia. The influence of the most aggressive elements of the non-Japanese
Asian business communities, the Overseas Chinese and Overseas Indian Networks cannot
help to be felt on Western management practice. Explains why this difference in decision-
making styles exists, analyzes the implications of the Asian decision-making style for
managing in Asia, and discusses its implications for the future of strategic marketing
management practice.
Introduction
Strategic decision-making in Asia is different (Haley and Tan, 1996;
Hofstede, 1994). One of the major differences in Asian decision-making
stems from the base of information available to, and desired by, Asian
decision-makers: this base often differs significantly from the base of
information used by traditional Western executives and strategic theorists
(Haley and Tan, 1996).
Various explanations have been posited to explain differences that emerge
between Asian and Western strategic decision-making. Haley and Tan
(1996) suggested competitive advantage as a possible explanation. Hofstede
(1994) argued that the reason for differences in decision-making styles was
ethnic and cultural; alternatively, Haley and Stumpf (1989) found differences
in decision-making traceable to personality type. Later, Haley (1997) found
evidence that there may be significant personality type differences between
the managerial cadres of different nationalities thereby giving support to
Hofstede's arguments. The truth probably is a combination of all the
different explanations. Haley and Tan's (1996) argument that the amount of
data available to decision-makers about local markets can be described as an
informational void relative to the amount available on industrialized
economies however, is unquestioned. This has led to a unique, strategic-
management style for many major Asian firms.
The Asian business environment
By looking at Table I, we can see why South and Southeast Asia, the region
in which these firms carry out the bulk of their operations, is so important.
When comparing the 14 nations that make up the region to the US, although
the land area and gross domestic product are smaller than those of the US,
their population is almost 650 percent that of the US. Additionally, their
economies, with some few exceptions, are growing faster than the economies
of virtually all Western (we include Japan, Asia's developed economy)
Differences between Asian
and Western strategic
decision-making
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economies, even during the present difficult economic period. Significantly,
South and Southeast Asia are not only made up of 14 basic sets of
environments (business, economic, regulatory, political, etc.), but 13 of the
nations are influenced by both their own native and colonial cultures. India
alone has 17 different languages and dozens of dialects.
Three major clusters of large businesses exist in Asia: government-linked
corporations (GLCs), either wholly or partly government controlled; family
businesses (many controlled by Indians or Overseas Chinese); and MNCs.
Historically, business prospered without local business and market
information ± they have not desired it and have adapted their strategies to
their environment.
GLCs usually began as suppliers of products/services in protected domestic
markets. For GLCs, strategic planning followed national plans for economic
growth and development; market information was never a critical success
factor. Hence, information was not a top priority. MNCs first entered Asia
over two centuries ago, however the manufacturing based MNCs which were
the first to have a significant economic impact in Asia, entered primarily
after WWII. They did not seek more local market information because they
seldom served local markets, but were investments aimed at rationalizing the
MNCs' production costs for products intended for their traditional markets in
Japan and the West (Haley and Tan, 1996).
The Overseas Chinese Networks (OCNs) probably constitute the single,
most-dominant, private business grouping in Asia outside of China, Japan,
and South Asia. In virtually every East and Southeast Asian country, the
degree of the OCNs' participation in the economy far outstrips its numbers in
the population. Today, they have used their networks to extend their reach
dramatically, and, increasingly, they are facing fierce competition from
MNCs and the growing Overseas Indian Networks (OINs). Many OCNs
started as merchants and traders. They moved into property-related
businesses, and then into any business deemed profitable. The OCNs were
Population* GDP** Area
(billions) (sq. mi)
Bangladesh 128,094,948 $122.0b 57,295
Brunei 292,266 2.5a 2,226
Burma 45,103,809 41.0b 261,228
Cambodia 10,561,373 6.0b 70,238
India 936,545,814 1,700.0c 1,222,243
Indonesia 203,583,886 571.0b 741,052
Laos 4,837,237 4.1b 91,429
Malaysia 19,723,587 141.0b 127,584
Pakistan 131,541,920 239.0b 339,697
Philippines 75,265,584 171.0b 115,860
Singapore 2,890,468 42.4b 247
Sri Lanka 18,342,660 53.5b 25,332
Thailand 60,271,300 323.0b 198,115
Vietnam 74,393,324 72.0b 127,246
Total 1,711,448,176 3,538.5 3,309,624
US 263,814,032 6,380.0b 3,679,192
Comparison 648.7% 55.4% 90.0%
Notes: *US Census Bureau (1995); **International Monetary Fund, purchasing power
equivalents unless otherwise noted. a = 1991 figure; b = 1993 figure; c = 1994 estimate
Table I. A comparison of South and Southeast Asia with the US
Government-linked
corporations
Overseas Chinese/Indian
Networks
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generally characterized by an entrepreneurial, intuitive, and fast decision-
making style, and paternalistic management. This was initially due to low
levels of education, especially business education, among the OCN founders.
The OINs and Indian Family Businesses (IFBs) in general, make decisions in
a similar way largely due to the highly regulated and protected competitive
environment. Senior managers' educational levels are frequently higher than
the norm for these countries.
Among these groups, decisions to invest, to grow, and to compete are made
mainly on the basis of business sense, experience, and their individual
propensity to take risks. With truly difficult decisions when additional
information is necessary, the groups usually depend on their network of
friends and government officials for the information. Trust and loyalty are
central concerns. Desired data are often subjective views or beliefs that raise
the businessmen's confidence in their decisions.
This somewhat holistic, intuitive decision-making style is well suited to
information-scarce environments or environments where market-survey data
seem suspect; it also serves to exclude new entrants without the established
communities' experience and network. For instance, many Asian banks have
historically served particular networks, not geographic areas; these
community bases persist today. Consequently, individuals applying for
business loans from Indonesian banks often find that the information
included in their applications has been transferred to the banks' related
company in the same business as the applicants'; and, that the related
company has even implemented the submitted business plans when entering
the applicants' projected markets (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1995)! Many
attribute the rapid growth of many OCN businesses in Southeast Asia to their
speed of decision-making (Chu and MacMurray, 1993); this speed and
domination of information makes it possible to seize major business
opportunities and constitutes a major competitive advantage for them.
The important characteristics that distinguish successful local companies
operating in South and Southeast Asia are:
(1) the companies appear highly diversified; often they undertake unrelated
diversification, contravening mainstream theoretical notions of business;
(2) the companies have good relationships with the often enormous public
sectors in these countries; and
(3) the companies have very strong family and informal networks.
As indicated earlier, foreign MNCs entered the region later. Manufacturing-
based MNCs (M-MNCs) were not the first foreign firms, but they were the
first to have great economic effect. In Southeast Asia, M-MNCs were key to
the region's export-led economic growth: when M-MNCs began
rationalizing manufacturing policies worldwide, they found Southeast Asia's
tax incentives, investment benefits, and cheap labor attractive, and
transferred some manufacturing operations to the region. Alternatively, at a
much later date, MNCs in India found the very large middle class, the very
large number of highly-trained and qualified people, and the wide use of the
English language and legal system, highly attractive. Yet, by some measures,
the Indian infrastructure lags behind even China. The public sector continues
to throw an imposing shadow over the economy; and, the zeal for economic
reform does not seem uniform.
Trust and loyalty
Three important
characteristics
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MNCs' managers seldom found decisions to relocate to South and Southeast
Asia difficult; in many instances, the host governments compiled and offered
the MNCs information relevant to such decisions. In Southeast Asia, the
MNCs' Asian operations did not serve local markets, but rather sought
production-cost advantages in worldwide operations. Products were
manufactured for export markets. Hence, the informational void was
unimportant. Their decisions to relocate manufacturing operations were
decisions made to maximize operational efficiency rather than to serve local
markets; decisions regarding the latter require much greater knowledge of
local environments. In South Asia, MNCs did concentrate on domestic
markets, but with a long-term focus, striving to build alliances with local
firms and public goodwill. Business however does not come easy and costs
loom high. For example, as one American MNC's CEO confided ``the
Indians did not invent bureaucracy, but they have elevated it to an art form''.
The informational black hole in Asia exists because of historical business
practice and because of participants' goals. As decision makers have not
desired more objective information, the region is an informational void for
those who do.
Cultural effects on Asian decision-making
Nakamura (1992), in considering strategic decision-making in East Asia,
argued that strategic decision-making processes in these countries were
following the same line of development that strategic decision-making did in
Japan. There are certain similarities in the manner in which the Japanese
economy and the economies of the East Asian nations he considered have
evolved; but there are also significant economic and cultural differences
which would indicate that Nakamura's arguments are faulty.
Economic similarity exists because most Asian economies, like Japan's, are
managed economies that have grown primarily through exports. The
differences lie in the source and direction of exports. The primary source of
exports for Japan has always been Japanese companies, and their exports,
until only recently, have been dominated by exports to North America and
Europe. The primary source of exports from non-Japanese Asian nations to
Western nations has usually been MNCs. Local firms have concentrated on
local markets, the markets which are now considered so important to
Western MNCs. Rather than building size and managerial expertise in
competition with Western companies, companies from other Asian nations
have built their size and managerial expertise within the informational void.
For this reason, the economic similarities between Japan and its Asian
neighbors are less significant than they might be.
There are also significant cultural differences that have resulted in very
different economic environments. If you consider Japanese firms, especially
the large ones, one thing which impresses is the age of the firms. Most of
Japan's major firms began as family firms which were built through growth
and evolved into the modern Japanese keiretsu conglomerates. The Japanese
Daoist culture and way of life incorporates an economic philosophy of
growth which includes primogeniture. The Confucian culture and way of life
also includes an economic element; however, Confucian economics is a
subsistence economic philosophy in which the peasant is exalted and the
merchant reviled and persecuted. By ancient Chinese custom, the merchant
is prohibited from wearing silk and riding, and he must go everywhere on
foot. It is no accident that there have been innumerable waves of Overseas
Chinese over the centuries. Every wave corresponds to a period of
Black hole
Differences lie in the source
and direction of exports
Significant cultural
differences
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persecution against the merchant classes. Confucian custom also emphasizes
large families and bans primogeniture; hence there is an ancient Chinese
saying which goes, ``No fortune survives the third generation''. Chinese
firms are relatively young; most of the major OCNs of today are only in their
first or second generation. The Confucian ban on primogeniture has been
breaking down in more economically developed Chinese societies such as
Hong Kong and Singapore, as exemplified by Li Ka Shen's transferring
control of the bulk of his business holdings to his eldest son. Hence, one can
expect many of the present OCN companies to grow and develop beyond the
third generation into true multinationals. Other differences lie in the
relationship between the individual and society. In Indian culture, for
example, there is no relationship between patriotism and filial piety. In
Japan, a saying goes, ``To be a good patriot is to be a good son''; the
equivalent saying in China is, ``One cannot be both a good patriot and a good
son''. A subtle, but significant difference which leads us into the area of
loyalty. In Japan, loyalty is very strong and functionally based, e.g., filial
loyalty is owed to the bread winner, not the actual father. In both Chinese
and Indian cultures, filial loyalty is owed to the father, regardless of who the
bread winner is, and loyalty is very personalized. Among the Indians, loyalty
is very strong. Loyalty among the Chinese however, though personalized, is
not very strong. Loyalty to a friend, master or employee is to the individual,
and does not survive the death of that individual. Hence, the father's friend is
not necessarily the son's. Ethical duty in Confucianism is limited to the five
relationships:
(1) Sovereign-Minister;
(2) Father-Son;
(3) Husband-Wife;
(4) Elder brother-Younger brother;
(5) Friends.
If a relationship does not fall within one of the above relationships, there is
no ethical duty or loyalty owed except to maintain social harmony. Thus,
without ties of family or friendship, duties owed in a commercial relationship
under Confucian ethical standards are not manifested in the same legalistic
perceptions and patterns of behavior as in many Western business cultures.
In the Indian cultures, commercial relationships are aided by ties of family or
friendship, but in commercial relationships contractual duties are viewed as
ethically binding in much the same legalistic way as they are in Western
cultures. Among the Japanese, contractual duties are viewed as binding, but
the ties that will help cement commercial relationships are not familial or ties
of friendship, but ties of personal and corporate mutual self-interest. Due to
the above mentioned cultural differences, among others, there is substantial
doubt that even with the passage of time and economic evolution, the South
and Southeast Asian business networks' decision-making will ever simply
follow in the steps of the Japanese. It is much more likely that the businesses
of South and Southeast Asia will go their own unique routes, and make their
own unique contributions to management theory and practice.
A significant difference which exists between the Overseas Chinese and the
Overseas Indian operating in South and Southeast Asia lies in the educational
levels of the founders. The founders of the OCNs were generally highly
intelligent individuals, but poorly educated. The Overseas Indian firms were
generally founded by people who were both very intelligent and well
Five relationships
Educational levels of the
founders
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educated. Hence, while both groups operate well in their region's
informational void, the overseas Indians tend to be better prepared to operate
in the Western strategic mode using all the data and strategic marketing
management techniques developed by strategic theorists. Thus the OINs
have tended to operate like Western firms when they have the available data,
and like the OCNs when they do not. An example which indicates the
importance of this difference is that few Singaporean firms have been
profitable in their US operations; Indian firms, however, have regularly been
highly successful. Increasingly, the younger generation of OCN leadership
has the same educational characteristics as the leadership of the OIN firms.
The result of culture, education and environment has resulted in a strategic
planning process that is very different from that of the West. Strategic
planning in South and Southeast Asia has developed into a process which is
ad-hoc and reactive, highly personalized, idiosyncratic to the leader, and
which uses relatively limited environmental scanning. Though Western
theorists and managers would tend to name these characteristics as poor
management, they have lauded many firms which are managed in just this
way. Singapore International Airlines is regularly named as the best run
airline in the world, yet it is run very much in accord with the principles and
practice of Asian management, and with an emphasis on good and efficient
service and a heavy investment in the best, proven technology.
Ghosh and Chan (1994) studied strategic-planning behavior among firms in
Singapore and Malaysia and came to the same conclusions. They found
planning activities to be ad-hoc and reactive. The only market related factor
of any importance was the ``CEO's personal knowledge of market'', which
was the fourth-most-important factor in contributing to success in planning.
While a CEO's experience is important in any situation, how many failures
must occur before the CEO gains that experience and how can a firm expand
beyond its local market? The experience of the OCNs and OINs indicates
that there are other ways of learning a relatively similar market which may
help avoid the great bulk of these failures.
Characteristics of Asian management
When sequential information and hard data contribute little to the relevance
or consequence of a decision, and in fact are simply nonexistent, Western
managers must study Asia's holistic/intuitive decision-making to be effective
in Asia if they are going to be able to compete with the major local firms on
their home turf. Little is known of Asia's holistic/intuitive decision-making.
Drawing on their observations and study of Asian executives, Haley and Tan
(1996) and Haley and Haley (1997) posited that the following characteristics
are common to experience-based holistic/intuitive decision-making:
(1) Hands-on experience;
(2) Transfer of knowledge;
(3) Qualitative information;
(4) Holistic information processing;
(5) Action-driven decision-making.
Hands-on experience
To make decisions quickly, without detailed analyses of hard data, managers
must be hands-on, line managers who know the firm's work routines and
processes, and know the product, market, business environment and industry
Strategic planning process
Planning activities ad-hoc
and reactive
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first hand. Without sufficient exposure to the workings of the trade,
managers will have difficulty putting things in perspective quickly enough to
make timely decisions. Consequently, many senior Asian businessmen
remain active in all aspects of their businesses. This level of involvement is
necessary to make the right decisions without data support. Wada (1992)
gives an example of a Hong Kong businessman responding within fifteen
minutes to an offer by Li Ka Shen, Chairman of the Hutchinson/Cheung
Kong, to enter into a major joint venture. The businessman's confidence in
Li's judgement and word, and his in-depth knowledge of the business and
markets under consideration, allowed him to make such a rapid decision.
Transfer of knowledge
Managers often have difficulty making decisions within new environmental
contexts. However, Asian companies often diversify into totally different,
non-core businesses. This runs contrary to given business wisdom of staying
within one's core business. For executives to succeed in industries where
they have no prior experience, they must be able to generalise from past
experience, and to apply those generalisations in the new context. The ability
to use knowledge to tackle new problems in different situations involves
conceptualisation skills different from analytical skills. Successful Asian
executives are more able to see the big picture, and to sense intuitively
winners from losers. Chu and MacMurray (1993) believe that conglomerate
diversification in Asia must change; yet, many businessmen in the region
feel that it is a major reason for their firms' enviable growth rates.
Qualitative information
Many Asian executives appear to take unnecessary risks by not doing
sufficient research or analysis before acting; this is misleading. The
executives often process myriad bits of information and consider several
alternatives in depth before they act. They differ from Western executives in
that their analysis may be, almost entirely, internal. Though their decision-
making may be highly articulated, Asian executives may not present the
results in a written analytical form.
Asian executives almost always use external sources of information in
making strategic decisions. Experience indicates that executives actively
seek out critical information that will impact their decisions. However, Asian
executives are less likely to seek published data. They use qualitative, even
subjective information supplied by friends, business associates, government
officials, and others whose judgement and character they trust. They prefer
to personally visit localities to check on information rather than to rely on
secondary data. Their local contacts can often supply up-to-date, accurate
unpublished information superior to available published or traditional
primary research alternatives.
Network building goes beyond linking oneself to senior government officials
or great industrialists. Asian businessmen, while criticised for not building
their firm's internal base of managerial talent, often invest heavily in
promising individuals they feel will be valuable future contacts without
seeking immediate favors. For example, long ago, Liem Sioe Liong of the
Salim Group met an army lieutenant he thought showed promise. Over the
years, he offered this officer his support in his military and political career.
The young lieutenant is now President Suharto of Indonesia and remains
Liem's close friend.
External sources of
information used
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Holistic information processing
Conventional analytical problem solving stresses sequential, systematic, and
step-by-step approaches to decision-making. This works best when managers
can obtain needed data. In an informational void situation, it is likely to be
unworkable. In the experience-based intuitive model, managers take a
general approach to problems, define parameters intuitively, and explore
solutions holistically. Such an approach resembles Asian thinking and
learning processes. It is an alternative mode of decision-making that
frequently works well, especially in those markets where it has evolved.
Action-driven decision-making
Speed constitutes a key characteristic of decision-making in Asian business.
Executives often make key decisions without consulting anyone. The
preference is for action. Many stories exists of well-known Asian executives
deciding on important matters in minutes and implementing the results
almost immediately. This speed reflects the executives' empowerment and
accountability. Executives often have great latitude in deciding matters.
Long debates and committee meetings rarely occur.
The Asian decision-making model reflects authoritative management.
However, when one person has both responsibility and authority, a little
authoritativeness can get work done faster. This was Kazuo Wada's
conclusion, and the main reason why he moved Yaohan's headquarters from
Japan to Hong Kong, and the international headquarters for all operations
outside of Hong Kong and China, to Singapore; the domestic Japanese
operations remain the only ones still with headquarters in Japan.
Implications for MNCs
Determine which markets are to be served. One aspect of doing business in
Asia is the lack of information tied to the abundance of opportunities. While
information is lacking, it does exist. Dredge it up, collate and analyse it, seek
out both hard data and subjective, the most up-to-date data and historical.
Treat your research as an investment that will produce substantial returns and
remember that those returns come both in the form of earning future profits
and avoiding future losses. Use the data to prioritise your potential product/
markets and to identify the major players and influences in them. Determine
which of those players would be legitimate, beneficial partners to work with,
and which should be avoided at all cost. A firm should use this information
to move into a product market on its own, or to help it to make a decision
rapidly if a desirable partner approaches the firm with an opportunity. One
aspect of the Overseas Chinese and Indian firms is that they can make
decisions blazingly fast ± it is one of their key competitive advantages in
competition with MNCs. Unlike Japanese firms, which sometimes seem to
move glacially, the Asian network firms move quickly and expect rapid
decisions from their potential partners; if an MNC follows standard operating
procedures, it is likely to lose a good opportunity. To move rapidly however,
they cannot wait until they perceive a potential opportunity to research a
market, they must have the knowledge substantially on hand and as
Slywotsky and Shapiro (1993) say, ``leverage to beat the odds''.
The firm must develop a flexible corporate culture which can react to dealing
with different managerial cultures in different parts of the world, promote
cultural sensitivity and seek out home/host similarities. The best way to
manage Asian operations is with Asians. As fast decisions are critical,
managers must have close links in each country to speed decision-making
and have ready access to the highest levels of corporate management. Using
A little authoritativeness
can get work done faster
Flexible corporate culture
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more locals with strong local connections, and building trust-based
relationships are some of the ways to establish stronger links to local
information. When this is not possible, however, MNCs are large, highly
complex organisations; somewhere the MNC's management group, there is
usually someone whose background is likely to have better prepared them to
deal with the Asian environment than is the norm for the firm's managers.
Phillips selected a highly trusted and historically successful Mexican
executive from its Latin American operations to their regional HQ in
Singapore on the premise that the Latin American environment, with its high
uncertainty, poor information base, and highly personal, autocratic style of
management would better prepare an executive for Asia than would working
in their European HQ; in this instance at least, they were right.
It is very hard to develop the kind of familiarity with a firm's markets and
operations necessary to react rapidly in a highly fluid, uncertain situation
without actual line management experience. Experience based training and
manning Asian operations with line managers rather than people who have
come up in staff functions is generally highly desirable. Line managers are
better able to understand their senior counterparts at most Asian firms as they
will have had many of the same operational experiences. People who have
come up in staff, without any line experience, have based decisions on
analysis of figures and reports which may not formally exist in the Asian
firms with which they will be dealing and will have great difficulty in
judging the legitimacy of some claims without experience in dealing with
similar operational situations. This kind of experience will also help
executives build local information links more rapidly as the senior Asian
managers with which they will interact will be better able to relate to the line
manager as an equal than he will to the staff member.
Finally, managers should learn to recognise the evolution of Asian
relationships. Unlike many other networks around the world, an individual's
acceptance within an Overseas Chinese network is flexible, and can vary due
to events on which the individual has no influence; acceptance does not
depend solely on the individual's actions, but also on others that affect
situation(s) in which the individual interacts with the network. Western
executives do not have total freedom to undertake some behaviors that may
help cement their position with an Overseas Chinese network. (This has
nothing to do with bribery, but with freedom to act independently and to
involve their families in business relationships as completely as the OCNs
often do.) Given this situation, it is imperative that western executives learn
to recognise the cues given by the Chinese to indicate what the state of a
relationship between two people is at any one time.
Implications for the marketing function
The implications of being drawn into competing with the networks on their
home turf for the practice of the marketing function in Asian markets are
significant, and cannot help but spill over into the practice of marketing in
the MNCs' home markets. The implications in terms of marketing's
traditional Four P's are as follows.
Product
Product management in Asia is severely affected by the widespread lack of
respect for intellectual property rights. This problem is often attributed to
there being no rule of law ± the Indian government openly uses this argument
in urging MNCs to invest in India rather than in other parts of Asia. The truth
is both better and worse. In Confucian Asia, to respect the property rights of
Building local information
links more rapidly
Overseas Chinese networks
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those with which you have no relationship depends on associating those
rights with social harmony. Where there is no historical precedence for the
particular property rights in question, as in the case of intellectual property
rights, this becomes highly problematical. The government must shift
people's way of thinking through strict enforcement of intellectual property
rights in a situation where not only the property rights pirate, but the lower
and middle level legal authorities feel that the property rights pirate is being
unjustly persecuted. Intellectual property rights have never existed under
Confucian custom and tradition. Thus, it is very easy, when confronted with
intellectual property right piracy, for local legal authorities to look the other
way given even a minimal incentive to do so regardless of the most severe
pressure from central governments. Though it is highly desirable to move
production of products as close to major markets as possible, it is imperative
for a firm to consider the differences that can exist between the legal statutes
of a nation and what can be considered the ``natural law'', or the ethical
perceptions, of a nation. The latter are very powerful and difficult for mere
legal statutes to overturn. So far, besides India, the major Asian economies
most successful in protecting intellectual property rights are Singapore and
Thailand, with Malaysia making an increasingly successful effort.
Place
Many of the limitations of distributing goods through any developing
nation's infrastructure apply to South and Southeast Asia. The networks
create the same kind of situation in the region as the major commercial
families do in Latin America due to their early and continuing dominance of
most significant distributors, wholesale and retail, in the region. Only last
year, K-Mart was forced to withdraw from Singapore after a costly attempt
to break into the cut-throat, minimal margin environment of the mass-market
in a major Asian retailing center. The Overseas Chinese have several
advantages when it comes to distribution within their home markets which
Western retailers should not ignore. K-mart's strength has always been a
good selection of moderate quality goods at a low price. When it tried to
break into Asia, it ran into local retailers which could match their prices
through the ability to accept even lower margins than K-mart at the same
time that they matched or bettered K-mart quality; also, the Confucian
loyalty relationship of friendship created a situation in which threatened
local retailers would receive the support of most, if not all of their long-term
suppliers.
Promotion and pricing
Promotion practices are affected by the Asian cultures just as they are
affected by all cultures. Firms must seek to ensure they do not offend local
custom and mores, and that they remain within the law. To one extent or the
other, most Asian cultures are linguistically sensitive: public signboards in
foreign languages are illegal in many Asian countries. Enforcement is
usually lax, however there are periodic crackdowns (recent ones occurred in
Indonesia and Vietnam). Much more problematical for Western firms are the
difficulties incurred in India, where some regions, such as the state of Tamil
Nadu, contain linguistically sensitive populations which resent the incursion
of the national Indian language, Hindi.
Pricing is often difficult for Western firms because of the additional costs
associated with international business operations, but also because the
networks are able to accept very low margins due to the family control of
most network firms. They are also frequently able to subsidise predatory
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pricing practices due to the conglomerate diversification which most of the
large networks have adopted, and due also to the fact that predatory pricing
is not recognised as a crime in most Asian nations. When it is, the networks
usually are able to deflect legal action through their government contacts.
In sum, the invasion of Asian markets by Western MNCs is occurring
because of the wealth and immense potential of these markets. Their
increasing international importance will cause Asian strategic planning to
follow Japanese planning concepts in one way, and in so doing cause
Nakamura to be correct in an unintended manner. As the Japanese MNCs
introduced to the West many standards of Japanese strategic planning, such
as just-in-time inventory systems and quality circles, so too will the Overseas
Chinese and Indian networks. The importance of non-Japanese markets, the
growing participation of Western MNCs in Asian markets, and the
increasing size and participation of Asian firms in Western markets, will
introduce many of the best Asian strategic marketing processes and concepts
to Western firms and strategic theory.
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